

# Stereotypes as Historical Accidents: Images of Social Class in Postcommunist Versus Capitalist Societies

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## Abstract

Stereotypes are ideological and justify the existing social structure. Although stereotypes persist, they can change when the context changes. Communism's rise in Eastern Europe and Asia in the 20th century provides a natural experiment examining social-structural effects on social class stereotypes. Nine samples from postcommunist countries ( $N = 2,241$ ), compared with 38 capitalist countries ( $N = 4,344$ ), support the historical, sociocultural rootedness of stereotypes. More positive stereotypes of the working class appear in postcommunist countries, both compared with other social groups in the country and compared with working-class stereotypes in capitalist countries; postcommunist countries also show more negative stereotypes of the upper class. We further explore whether communism's ideological legacy reflects how societies infer groups' stereotypic competence and warmth from structural status and competition. Postcommunist societies show weaker status–competence relations and stronger (negative) competition–warmth relations; respectively, the lower meritocratic beliefs and higher priority of embeddedness as ideological legacies may shape these relationships.

## Keywords

social class, stereotype, historical context, communism, capitalism

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The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production.

—Karl Marx (1846/1968, p. 64)

They [stereotypes] are primarily rationalizers. They adapt to the prevailing temper of prejudice or the needs of the situation.

—Gordon W. Allport (1954, p. 204)

Stereotypes of groups are defined by the social context. The content of stereotypes follows historical events and related changes in intergroup relations. For example, shortly after World War II, for Americans, the “scientifically minded” and “industrious” Germans of 1933 turned into “extremely nationalist,” “aggressive,” and “arrogant” Germans of 1951 (Bergsieker, Leslie, Constantine, & Fiske, 2012, Study 4;

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Gilbert, 1951; Karlins, Coffman, & Walters, 1969; Katz & Braly, 1933). Likewise, Italian Fascists admired Aryans, but this group has disappeared from their most common stereotypes (Durante et al., 2013; Durante, Volpato, & Fiske, 2010). The society's normative climate regulates the expression of stereotypes. Americans' stereotype expression became less negative across the 20th century, as anti-prejudice societal norms developed (Bergsieker et al., 2012). Social context, then, shapes stereotypes of particular social groups through social representations and normative regulations within society.

The stereotype content model (SCM; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) formalized the relation between social context and stereotype content. The model postulates that structural relations between groups, specifically groups' relative status and their cooperative versus competitive interdependence, predict their perceived competence and warmth, respectively. Competing models agree on two dimensions: one vertical (status/competence/agency/dominance) and one horizontal, variously interpreted as warmth, cooperation-competition, communion, trustworthiness, and me-them differences (see adversarial synthesis by Abele, Ellemers, Fiske, Koch, & Yzerbyt, under review). Spontaneous descriptions of 87 societal groups prioritize terms machine-coded as warmth (morality, sociability) and competence (capability, assertiveness; Nicolas, Bai, & Fiske, under review), so these continue to be viable dimensions. Evidence from both correlational (Cuddy et al., 2009; Eckes, 2002) and experimental (Caprariello, Cuddy, & Fiske, 2009; Durante, Tablante, & Fiske, 2017) studies supports the SCM's assumptions: groups' status translates into perceptions of competence (capability, effectiveness), and groups' cooperativeness translates into perceptions of warmth (trustworthiness, sociability).

The SCM essentially describes a loop. People observe the societal positions of various groups (their social status and cooperative intent) and assume that it reflects the content of their character. This is stereotypic logic, which contains dispositional bias (underestimate the situation) and sample bias (observe a limited subpopulation). People then use their inferred group characteristics (stereotypes) to further justify the groups' societal positions.

How do societies break this loop? Considering the evidence on the causal relationships between structural characteristics of societies and stereotypes (Caprariello et al., 2009), changes in the structure should come first. Radical changes in social structures, however, are rare. The current article contributes to understanding socio-structural determinants of stereotype content by looking into a set of former communist countries that have undergone dramatic structural changes in the last century. Following the Marxist ideology, social groups in these societies experienced radical shifts in their status. Considering that Marxism is an ideology that first and foremost addresses the class struggle between the working class, or the proletariat, and the upper class, or the bourgeoisie, these structural changes should

predominantly affect these social class images. Hence, this article focuses on social class stereotypes, providing a comparative perspective on the social class stereotypes in countries with and without a communist history. We expect to find traces of the communist legacy both in the content of social class stereotypes and in the relationships between structural antecedents and stereotype content. As the working class is at the center of the communist ideology, we first take a closer look at how this group is construed in postcommunist versus capitalist countries.

## Ideology of Communist Versus Capitalist Social Structures

Inequality is an inevitable part of a free market economy. In the absence of government regulations and redistribution of the income, the rich tend to get richer and the poor get poorer (Piketty, 2014). Meritocratic beliefs are the ideological driving force of a capitalist society. As long as people believe that status and success depend on merit, talents, and hard work, inequalities are justified. However, meritocratic beliefs, as any other system-legitimizing myths, are a double-edged sword. They make the most disadvantaged members of societies fully responsible for their lower status in a societal hierarchy. As Owen Jones puts it in "Chavs," a best-selling book about the working class in the United Kingdom, "The plight of some working-class people is commonly portrayed as a 'poverty of ambition' on their part. It is their individual characteristics, rather than a deeply unequal society rigged in favor of the privileged, that is held responsible" (Jones, 2012, p. 10).

## Working Class (and Other Classes) in Capitalist Societies

Early studies on stereotypes of the working class in the United States indicated predominantly negative or mixed images. For example, a study of students' attitudes toward various occupations and people employed in those occupations aimed to document evaluations of them (Osgood & Stagner, 1941). Both for jobs and for people, ratings of manual workers (postman, carpenter, miner, etc.) were below average on characteristics such as *brains* (vs. *brawn*), *noticed* (vs. *disregarded*), *leader* (vs. *follower*). The general prestige of these occupations was also considerably lower than the average. Another survey of college students (Stagner, 1950) found evidence for mixed stereotypes of the working class. The most frequently used terms to describe the working class were *friendly*, *talkative*, and *kind* (indicating warmth). However, among frequent descriptions were also *ignorant* and *lazy* (indicating incompetence). A decade later, a similar pattern emerged (Davidson, Riessman, & Meyers, 1962). A vignette study, where descriptions of people varied only by their occupation (e.g., factory owner, teacher, factory worker), showed that workers received more negative

descriptions than representatives of any other occupation. Workers were seen as less *industrious, thoughtful, confident*, and *intelligent*; only two positive characteristics were ascribed to workers: they were seen as *warmer* and less *selfish* (a pattern consistent with the compensation effect, a trade-off between warmth and competence; e.g., Yzerbyt, Kervyn, & Judd, 2008).

A review on perceptions of low-status workers (Volpato, Andrighetto, & Baldissarri, 2017) argues that the negative stereotypes of the working class are invariant across time and cultural contexts. As they show, historically, people who carried out the “dirty” and manual work have been dehumanized and denied basic civil rights. Negative stereotypes have always been used to legitimize this treatment. However, findings of recent cross-cultural studies indicate that stereotypes of the working class are more mixed.

Ambivalent stereotypes of the working class with medium-to-high warmth and low-to-medium competence appear in Germany (Asbrock, 2010) and the United States (Durante et al. 2017, Study 3; Fiske et al., 2002). Large cross-cultural surveys conducted within the SCM framework indicate that in most countries where the working class emerges as a salient social group, it usually falls into the low-to-medium competence and medium-to-high warmth clusters (Cuddy et al., 2009; Durante et al., 2013). However, no systematic analysis of the working-class stereotypes across contexts has been conducted yet.

This article argues against the cross-cultural invariance of wholly negative working-class stereotypes (the Volpato et al., 2017, portrayal), by contrasting well-studied samples from capitalist countries with samples from postcommunist countries that have been underrepresented in the literature on stereotypes. Communist countries accounted for about 34% of the world’s population in the 1980s (Eberstadt, 2003). To be able to make an argument for or against cross-cultural invariability of working-class stereotypes, evidence from communist and postcommunist countries needs to be considered. As the working class has a special status in communist ideology, this comparison can be characterized as a natural experiment for testing the assumption of the historical and sociocultural rootedness of stereotypes.

## Working Class (and Other Classes) in Postcommunist Societies

At the time when Karl Marx was making his observations of capitalist societies in Europe, welfare states were not yet in place. The image of a capitalist society of the 19th century that he drew in his work was grim. The upper class, or the bourgeoisie, owned the means of production, and their only motive was profit. They exploited the working class, or the proletariat, by taking the surplus value (the difference between what laborers produce and what they earn) from the laborer, thus accumulating capital. In such a society, wealth and power concentrate in the hands of few, whereas the

majority (the workers) become alienated and de-humanized (Marx, 1844/2016, 1867/1983). His solution to the problem of inequality was radical:

They [the Communists] openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. *Working men of all countries, unite!* (Marx & Engels, 1848/1969, p. 137)

Answering the call, the Russian October Revolution of 1917 gave rise to the first socialist state in history. Many Eastern European states followed or were forced to follow this path, soon to be joined by several countries in Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Russia was the first country to adopt communism as a state ideology and its practices were used in many other countries that followed the communist path, so we provide a more detailed account of changes that the communist regime brought to the role of the working class, using the case of Russia and later, the larger USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, founded in 1922).

Bringing Marx’s plan to life, in the early years of the USSR, the “dictatorship of the proletariat” was announced as a transitional stage toward the classless system of communism. The oppressed and the exploited of the past became, at least nominally, the ruling class. The Bolshevik party’s challenge now was to create an image of the working class as “the collective hero of world history” (Bonnell, 1998, p. 22). State propaganda was used to establish the new reality of social class relations. All forms of art, especially visual art that was accessible to the majority of the population, put the worker at the center (“Social Realism”). The hammer and the sickle became the official state symbols represented on the USSR flag. Discriminatory laws cemented the dominant status of the working class: Non-proletarians were not allowed to vote and could not become members of the Communist party. Universities gave preference to individuals with working-class backgrounds in the admission process, and the judicial system favored them in cases against the “class aliens” (Fitzpatrick, 1993). Although the reality of the working class’ socioeconomic status varied considerably across states and time, the worker remained the central figure of the communist propaganda until the collapse of the USSR.

Not long after the USSR ceased in 1991, which ended the Communist era of Eastern European history, the working class started disappearing from the public discourse. Extreme poverty and unemployment rates that followed the collapse (Stenning, 2005) contributed to the dissolution of the working-class identity. The working class became “politically, ideologically and culturally invisible” (Roberts & Pollock, 2009, p. 580). As a result of rapid political and economic transformations, new classes emerged. Some of the former proletarians transitioned to a newly formed “underclass”—the unemployed, impoverished, and disillusioned (Stenning, 2005). Others transitioned into the emerging middle class (Roberts &

Pollock, 2009). Finally, a new upper class formed, the new capitalists who rapidly accumulated wealth as a result of privatization of governmental property at the beginning of the 1990s. The “class struggle” of the past, however, still manifests itself in people’s attitudes: The new rich are viewed by many with contempt for the unjustly acquired wealth, whereas the poor are seen as kind and moral (Gorshkov & Tikhonova, 2003; Ryvkina, 2001).

## Sources of Expected Differences

As outlined above, the structural changes in communist societies should have led to changes in the content of stereotypes of social classes, which can be observed when comparing these societies and those without a communist past. There are at least two reasons to expect such differences. First, changes in the positions of the groups in the societal hierarchy could have also changed the societal antecedents of stereotypes, namely, status and competition. If this is the case, we would expect people in postcommunist countries to perceive the working class as having higher and upper class as having lower status than people in capitalist countries. Similarly, the working class would be seen as more cooperative and the upper class as less cooperative in countries with a communist past. However, given that almost 30 years have passed since the collapse of the communist bloc and the current positions of social classes resemble quite closely those in capitalist countries (Evans & Mills, 1999), this is not the most likely source of expected differences.

The second source of such differences potentially lies in the links between these societal antecedents and stereotypes. Although institutional and structural legacies of communism might be slowly fading, at least in some countries (Lane & Myant, 2007), its psychological legacy seems to be more persistent (Barni, Vieno, & Roccato, 2016; Cichocka & Jost, 2014). The communist experiment had long-lasting effects on social relations and beliefs in these societies, which likely affected how people draw inferences from groups’ status and competitiveness. We will first discuss SCM’s predicted link between status and competence and then turn to the link between competition and warmth.

In a communist society, status is not necessarily a strong indicator of competence. The underlying principle is “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” (Blanc, 1851, p. 92), meaning that the society should strive for strict egalitarianism rather than merit-based distribution. In the USSR, for example, university graduates were assigned to a job with a standard wage; no open job-market competition existed. This and similar practices were likely to have an impact on meritocratic beliefs in these countries. And, indeed, recent studies show that postcommunist countries have lower levels of meritocratic beliefs compared with capitalist countries (Kunovich & Slomczynski, 2007; Mason, 1995). We expect to see a weaker link between groups’ status and competence in postcommunist countries,

reflecting these historical differences in societies’ distributive systems.

A related but distinct characteristic of a communist society is its collectivistic nature. The communist ideology requires putting the needs of a group above the needs of an individual. Being different, standing out from the crowd, is discouraged and can even be dangerous. In an early study of postcommunist Eastern Europe (van den Broek & de Moor, 1994), Eastern Europeans valued initiative and achievement less than their Western counterparts. In a study of teachers’ and students’ values in nine Eastern European and 12 Western European countries (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997), Eastern Europeans valued Conservatism (later renamed Embeddedness; importance of order, obedience, conformity) significantly more and Autonomy (importance of independence, freedom, excitement) significantly less than Western Europeans. These differences were present in both generations, and, according to the authors, they were an adaptation to communism, which demanded conformity, suppressed initiative and freedom, and sanctioned disobedience. Based on this evidence, postcommunist societies should impose a harsher penalty on competitiveness compared with capitalist countries, leading to a stronger negative link between groups’ competition and warmth.

## The Current Research

Stereotypes are historical accidents in the sense that they reflect social relations in societies and can change when these relations change. Communism and capitalism, as a natural experimental manipulation, can shape the content of societal stereotypes. To uncover the impact of such ideologies, we analyze the contents and the social-structural rootedness of stereotypes in societies with versus without a communist past (i.e., capitalist societies). To be able to make meaningful comparisons with samples from capitalist countries collected earlier, we use the same methodological procedure and measures as in earlier SCM studies (Fiske et al., 2002).

## Overview

The working class was at the center of the communist ideology, so we start our analyses by looking at the salience (frequency of mentions) and the position of the working class in the SCM map of countries with a communist past. The postcommunist sample includes Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan representing the former USSR (data collected in 2017), plus Kosovo (Albanian population, data collected in 2018) and China (data collected in 2014, Wu, Bai, & Fiske, 2018). This set of countries covers a wide range of world’s cultural regions, including Eastern Europe (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kosovo), Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan), East Asia

(China), and West Asia/Middle East (Armenia, Georgia). This variation allows disentangling the consequences of countries' communist legacy from other culture-specific differences.

Next, we combine data on stereotype content of social groups in capitalist societies (Cuddy et al., 2009; Durante, Fiske, et al., 2017; Durante et al., 2013), kindly provided to us by the authors, with our postcommunist dataset. Putting social class stereotypes in a comparative perspective, we test differences in social class stereotypes, as well as their structural antecedents, in postcommunist versus capitalist societies.

To test whether observed differences in stereotype content can be attributed to differences in the links between societal antecedents and stereotypes, we test whether communist legacy moderates these links. Finally, we explore meritocratic beliefs and embeddedness values, ideological correlates of communist and capitalist social structures, to investigate potential mechanisms that shape the relations between structural antecedents and stereotype content. To do so, we integrate archival data for country-level meritocratic beliefs and embeddedness values from World Value Survey (WVS, 2010-2014, Wave 6, the most recent) into our dataset.

### Analytical Approach

We conducted data analysis with R-3.4.4 and Python 3.5.2. We ran multilevel models for hierarchical data, with social groups nested within countries (unless stated otherwise), using lmer4 and lmerTest in R. Before fitting the models, we factor coded categorical variables and centered continuous independent variables for interaction tests. To assess statistical significance, we calculate *p* values with approximated degrees of freedom for each predictor.

Under each section, we report specific research questions, participants, measures, analysis strategy, power considerations, results, and interim discussions. All data and materials are available and can be accessed at <https://osf.io/w2mbz/>, including raw data, analysis codes, visualization, and supplementary materials.

## Study 1: Stereotypes of the Working Class in Postcommunist Societies

Under communist regimes, the working class was portrayed as “the collective hero of world history” (Bonnell, 1998, p. 22). Although the current position of the working class in postcommunist countries is similar to other capitalist countries (Evans & Mills, 1999; Roberts & Pollock, 2009; Stenning, 2005), we expected the working class still to be salient in postcommunist societies and its historically positive images still to be reflected in its stereotype content.

### Method

**Preliminary group-listing task.** Independent samples nominated each nation's salient groups for the main sample to rate. Replicating the procedure of Fiske et al. (2002) within each country, we selected groups mentioned by at least 15% of respondents. The final groups may differ by country, but they reflect country-specific salient groups.

**Participants.** A total of 378 participants in nine countries volunteered to complete a group-listing task. The sample comprised 69% female, mean age 25, predominant ethnic groups in their respective countries, and diverse religious groups (see Table 1—Group listing).

**Measures.** Participants read the following instructions in their native language (all materials translated and back-translated): “Off the top of your head, what various types of people do you think today's society categorizes into groups (e.g., based on gender, age, ethnicity, occupation, religion, etc.)? In the space below, please list between eight to sixteen such groups.” Two additional questions aimed at eliciting neglected low-status groups and taken-for-granted reference groups (see full questionnaire in the Supplementary Information).

**Main study.** Next, in nine new samples, we collected warmth and competence ratings, to map each group, and related ratings to validate them.

**Participants.** Participants from nine postcommunist countries took part in the scale rating survey (*N* = 1,863). The sample comprised 59% female, average age 29; more than 70% of participants were from their nation's majority ethnic groups and reported diverse religions (see Table 1—SCM main survey).

**Measures.** Participants rated their country's salient groups on scales of warmth, competence, status, competition, emotions elicited, and behavioral tendencies. The full questionnaire is included in the Supplementary Information. To prevent fatigue, we divided social groups into two to three subsets when the number of groups was higher than 15 and asked participants to rate one subset. The instruction read, “We intend to investigate the way societal groups are viewed by the [country] society.” To focus on consensually shared societal stereotypes, the instruction continued, “Thus, we are *not* interested in your personal beliefs, but in how you think they are viewed by others.” All measures were translated and back-translated by native speakers; full configural, full metric, and partial scalar invariance was established for the four constructs of interest: warmth, competence, status, and competition (see Supplementary Information for details).

**Warmth.** Participants rated five items: “To what extent do most  $C_i$  view members of  $G_j$  as warm/well-intentioned/

**Table 1.** Participant Demographics (Postcommunist Samples).

Country	Sample size	Age	Female (%)	Ethnicity	Religion
<b>Group listing</b>					
Armenia	76	31	75	100% Armenian	92% Christian
Belarus	37	19	78	78% Belarusian	76% Orthodox
Georgia	34	25	70	97% Georgian	47% Georgian Orthodox
Kazakhstan	37	29	43	89% Kazakh	81% Muslim
Russia	48	22	85	79% Russian	42% Christian
Ukraine	35	21	86	100% Ukrainian	57% Christian
Uzbekistan	46	22	50	100% Uzbek	98% Muslim
Kosovo	40	NA	NA	75% Albanian	75% Muslim
China	25	NA	NA	100% Han	NA
<b>SCM main survey</b>					
Armenia	138	30 (10)	70	100% Armenian	75% Christian
Belarus	142	25 (17)	57	72.5% Belarusian	57.1% Orthodox
Georgia	303	35 (13)	67.80	94.1% Georgian	56% Georgian Orthodox
Kazakhstan	203	28 (10)	60	77.3% Kazakh	55.1% Muslim
Russia	220	28 (11)	80	75.9% Russian	35.5% Orthodox Christian
Ukraine	210	31 (12)	71.50	88.3% Ukrainian	35.6% Orthodox Christian
Uzbekistan	248	26 (8)	37.90	94.8% Uzbek	99.2% Muslim
Kosovo	141	32 (10)	48	73% Albanian	49% Muslim
China	199	25 (5)	40	95% Han	NA

Note. Data for China were collected by Wu, Bai, and Fiske (2018); other participants were newly recruited and responses were analyzed for the current study.

friendly/sincere/moral?" on a scale of 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*extremely*). For each statement,  $C_i$  refers to country name, and  $G_j$  refers to group name. Cronbach's alpha ranged from .78 to .92 ( $Mdn = .90$ ).

**Competence.** Participants rated three items, formatted as before: competent, capable, and skilled. Cronbach's alpha ranged from .70 to .85 ( $Mdn = .81$ ).

**Status.** Two items measured perceived social status on a scale of 1 to 5. Example item: "How prestigious are the jobs generally held by members of  $G_j$ ?" Cronbach's alpha ranged from .62 to .82 ( $Mdn = .80$ ). The two items correlate in a range from .45 to .79 ( $Mdn = .68$ ).

**Competition.** Three items, consisting of both realistic and symbolic threats, measured perceived competition on a scale of 1 to 5. Example item: "How much does special treatment given to  $G_j$  make things more difficult for other groups in  $C_i$ ?" Cronbach's alpha ranged from .60 to .75 ( $Mdn = .69$ ).

**Group perceptions.** We averaged individual ratings and computed group-level warmth, competence, status, and competition for each rated group in each society.

**Societal average.** Given each group's warmth and competence ratings, we calculated societal midpoints for all groups in each society. We then used the societal average as an anchor to compare how the working class was evaluated relative to other groups.

**Individual average.** We selected subsets that contain individual ratings on the working class. For each individual, we calculated their average score for other groups and their ratings for the working class. This individual average provides

a reference point for individuals' perception of the working class. Individual data were available in all countries but China.

**Power considerations.** We need at least 16 participants to rate each social group in each country, for a 95% confidence interval with a standard deviation of 1 (based on previous studies). Previous SCM studies pragmatically collected an average of 80 participants. Therefore, we collected more than 80 participants and ensured more than 16 participants in each country rated every group.

The group-level analysis (working class vs. societal average comparison) includes 11 groups (22 observations), which provides sufficient power to detect only large effects ( $d = 1.21^1$ ). For this reason, we supplement it with multilevel analysis of individual-level data, which includes 908 individuals (1,816 observations) nested in seven countries<sup>2</sup> (excluding China due to unavailability of individual-level data and Kosovo due to absence of the working class among the salient groups).

## Results

**Salience of the working class.** In the group-listing task, eight out of nine postcommunist samples mentioned the societal group of workers or the working class: 19% Armenians, 43% Belarusians, 49.8% Georgians, 22% Kazakhstanis, and 19% Russians mentioned workers; 17% Ukrainians mentioned workers or working class; 59% Uzbekistanis mentioned low-skilled workers and 15% mentioned people with vocational

training; 24% Chinese mentioned workers, 24% mentioned migrant workers, and 20% mentioned blue collars. However, Kosovars did not list the working class in this study.<sup>3</sup> By SCM criterion of 15% mentions counting as a known group in everyday discourse, the working-class groups are part of the cultural landscape in these societies.

To compare with eight of nine samples mentioning working class, some other social class-related groups appeared equally often. Eight samples mentioned lower-class or poor people: Armenia (25%), Georgia (18%), Kazakhstan (14%), Russia (35%), Ukraine (34%), Uzbekistan (17%), Kosovo (45%), and China (20%). Seven mentioned upper-class or rich people: Armenia (26%), Georgia (21%), Russia (19%), Ukraine (34%), Uzbekistan (17%), Kosovo (48%), and China (32%). However, only four countries mentioned the middle class: Russia (17%), Ukraine (14%), Kosovo (23%), and China (28%). If nine cases (countries) allow any conclusions, social classes in general (except the middle class) seem salient in almost all samples at the 15% threshold.

To interpret this result requires a baseline, however. We compared frequencies with mentioning other social groups in these societies. Each social group was mentioned by 2.8 countries on average. Students and youth were mentioned by eight countries. Women, men, rich, disabled, and pensioners were mentioned by seven countries. Most other social groups were idiosyncratic, not commonly mentioned across post-communist samples (see Table S1 in Supplementary Information). Thus, social classes were more salient than the average group, and about equivalent to gender, for example.

**Group evaluations of the working class within society.** First, we investigated relative positions of different social groups regarding perceived warmth and competence. We performed Ward agglomerative hierarchical clustering and *k*-means clustering analyses to categorize social groups. We found four to six clusters as optimal solutions that effectively classify (dis)similar social groups on warmth and competence dimensions. Cluster analyses mapped most working-class groups onto high-to-medium positions (Figure 1): the high-competence, high-warmth cluster in Armenia, Kazakhstan, Russia, and China; the medium-competence, medium-warmth cluster in Belarus, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan; but the low-competence, medium-warmth cluster in Georgia. Cluster memberships mostly mark the working class as successful and trustworthy. The full SCM maps for the eight new samples included in this study are in the Supplemental Appendix.

Next, we compared working-class groups with the societal average using paired sample *t* tests on country-level scores. Participants rated workers as significantly warmer,  $M = 3.43$ ,  $SD = 0.14$ ,  $t(10) = 2.66$ ,  $p = .024$ ,  $d = 2.89$ , and nonsignificantly more competent,  $M = 3.32$ ,  $SD = 0.35$ ,  $t(10) = 1.21$ ,  $p = .253$ ,  $d = 2.70$ , than the societal average,  $M_{warmth} = 3.25$ ,  $SD = 0.24$ ;  $M_{competence} = 3.19$ ,  $SD = 0.19$ . For by-country comparisons, see Figure S1.

**Individual evaluations of the working class.** To remedy the small degrees of freedom on the group-level analysis, we compared individual ratings of the working-class groups and their subset average. To control within-country dependencies, we performed multilevel regression with working class versus subset average as categorical predictor and competence and warmth ratings as outcome variables, allowing random country intercepts. We also controlled for age to account for personal experience of communism (participants born after 1991 never lived under communism). Participants rated workers as significantly both warmer ( $b = .13$ ,  $SE = .03$ , 95% CI = [0.07, 0.18],  $t = 4.35$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and more competent ( $b = .13$ ,  $SE = .03$ , 95% CI = [0.07, 0.20],  $t = 4.09$ ,  $p < .001$ ) than subset average; age had no effect.


## Discussion

We observed frequent mentions and positive perceptions of the working class in most of our samples. They are inconsistent with the existing literature on negative stereotypes of the working class (Volpato et al., 2017) and the ambivalent stereotypes elsewhere, as reviewed above. The ideological legacy of communism provides a plausible explanation for the salience of the working class and their positive image in these societies. However, to claim that these positive images are a consequence of communist legacy, a comparative approach is necessary.

## Study 2: Class Perceptions in Postcommunist Versus Capitalist Societies

As an ideology of class struggle, communism was creating a positive image of the working class at the expense of those who were the exploiters of the past. As the introduction noted, the upper class was construed as the “class alien” (Fitzpatrick, 1993) and the main cause of all the suffering of the working people. Therefore, we expected to find a more positive image of the working class, accompanied by a more negative image of the upper class in postcommunist countries compared with capitalist countries. As the middle class is just emerging in postcommunist countries (Roberts & Pollock, 2009), the communist legacy should not have affected the perceptions of this group. Thus, we did not expect to see any differences in the stereotypes of the middle class in two samples.

The lower class in modern postcommunist societies can be seen as the successor of the working class from the past: While some workers moved to the middle class after the collapse of the USSR, many had to go through unemployment and poverty, creating a new lower class (Roberts & Pollock, 2009; Stenning, 2005). Sociological studies in former USSR countries find that poor people are perceived as kind and moral (Gorshkov & Tikhonova, 2003; Ryvkina, 2001). We therefore expected the stereotypes of the lower class to be



**Figure 1.** The position of the working class in the SCM maps in nine postcommunist countries (Study 1).

Source. China figure adapted from Wu, Bai, and Fiske (2018).

Note. Clustering analysis on social groups in nine postcommunist societies. X-axis indicates competence and y-axis indicates warmth. Each dot represents each social group. Working-class groups are circled (note that working class was not mentioned in Kosovo). See Supplementary Information for figures with group labels annotated. SCM = stereotype content model.

more positive in postcommunist societies compared with capitalist societies. In addition to stereotype content, we further explored whether there were corresponding differences in groups' perceived status and competitiveness.

## Method

**Participants.** Data on societal stereotypes and social antecedents came partly from an earlier SCM database composed of 49 samples collected in 38 nations (Cuddy et al., 2009; Durante, Fiske, et al., 2017; Durante et al., 2013). For the purpose of country-level comparisons, we combined subsamples in a country if they rated the same social groups (see Supplementary Information), which left us 41 samples from 38 nations. To this, we added the nine postcommunist

samples. Therefore, our final international dataset consisted of 50 samples from 47 nations with 1,211 social groups. See demographics for previous nations in the work by Durante, Fiske, et al. (2017, Supplementary Information; Table S2).

## Measures

**Group listing.** In each country, an open-ended questionnaire asked participants to list which types of people are generally categorized into groups in their society (details in the work by Durante, Fiske, et al., 2017). The procedure follows SCM group-listing study as described in the previous section.

**Social class group coding.** Given the spontaneous nature of group name generation processes, we gathered diverse labels of social groups. To classify groups into social class groups,



**Table 2.** Comparing Frequency of Mentions in Postcommunist and Capitalist Societies (Study 2).

N of groups related to	Postcommunist	Capitalist	Postcommunist	Capitalist
	Raw counts		Proportion	
Any social class groups	31	133		
Upper class	7	37	0.226	0.278
Middle class	4	25	0.129	0.188
Working class	11	27	0.355	0.203
Lower class	9	44	0.290	0.331

Note. Upper class includes upper-class, rich, rich people, large income, elite. Middle class includes middle-class, the middle-class, white collar. Working class includes working class, workers, blue collar, laborers, unskilled workers, low-skilled workers, manual workers, construction workers, migrant working class, tradies, people with vocational training. Lower class includes lower class, poor, the poor, poor people, low income, slum dwellers, welfare recipients.

three judges independently coded whether they thought a group belongs to upper, middle, working, or lower class—blind to warmth, competence, status, and competition ratings. A fourth independent judge integrated the results; 93% of the judgments were consistent. The inconsistencies mainly involved labels with higher ambiguity (e.g., *employed, working people*), specificity (e.g., *Chavs, Westies*), and cultural distinctions (e.g., *migrant workers* in European countries vs. China), which were excluded or adjusted after consulting with the original source. Across all countries, we identified a total of 164 social class groups, including 44 upper-class, 29 middle-class, 38 working-class, and 53 lower-class groups.

**Stereotype content ratings on social class group.** We then used the above social class–related groups, dummy-coded society type, and factor-coded social class type. We included evaluations on warmth, competence, status, and competition for each social class group. The evaluations were obtained following the same procedure as described in the previous section.

**Analysis strategy.** To compare perception differences in postcommunist and capitalist societies, we conducted multilevel regressions for the upper middle class, working class, and lower class, respectively. Group ratings were nested within country. We included competence, warmth, status, and competition as dependent variables, and society type as a predictor variable, controlling for respondent age and allowing for country random intercept.

**Power considerations.** Sensitivity analysis revealed that current sample size has enough power to detect only large effects:  $d = 1.38$  for upper class,  $d = 1.82$  for middle class,  $d = 1.20$  for working class, and  $d = 1.22$  for lower class.

## Results


**Salience of social classes.** All samples in postcommunist societies and capitalist societies mentioned social class–related groups. However, the frequency of mentions differed for two

groups (see Table 2). As expected, working class was the only social class mentioned more frequently by postcommunist societies compared with capitalist societies (89% of com. vs. 63% of cap.). Upper class (78% of com. vs. 85% of cap.), middle class (44% of com. vs. 54% of cap.), and lower class (89% of com. vs. 93% of cap.) were mentioned less frequently by postcommunist societies than capitalist societies.

**Less competent upper class.** As predicted, compared with participants in capitalist countries, participants in postcommunist countries rated the upper class as significantly less competent ( $b = -.34$ ,  $SE = .13$ ,  $t = -2.61$ , 95% CI =  $[-0.59, -0.08]$ ,  $p = .013$ ).<sup>4</sup> We found no significant differences in the competence attributed to the lower class ( $b = .28$ ,  $SE = .15$ ,  $t = 1.847$ , 95% CI =  $[-0.02, 0.58]$ ,  $p = .072$ ), the working class ( $b = .31$ ,  $SE = .20$ ,  $t = 1.548$ , 95% CI =  $[-0.08, 0.69]$ ,  $p = .132$ ), and the middle class ( $b = .19$ ,  $SE = .20$ ,  $t = 0.926$ , 95% CI =  $[-0.21, 0.58]$ ,  $p = .363$ ). The competence data do not show strong evidence for postcommunist positivity toward lower and working class; however, the lower perceived competence of upper class is consistent (see Figure 2).

**Warmer working class and lower class.** Also, as predicted, participants in postcommunist countries gave significantly warmer ratings to the working class ( $b = .39$ ,  $SE = .10$ ,  $t = 3.916$ , 95% CI =  $[0.19, 0.58]$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and the lower class ( $b = .38$ ,  $SE = .13$ ,  $t = 2.963$ , 95% CI =  $[0.13, 0.63]$ ,  $p = .005$ ). Conversely, we found no significant differences in the attributed warmth for upper ( $b = -.22$ ,  $SE = .15$ ,  $t = -1.493$ , 95% CI =  $[-0.50, 0.07]$ ,  $p = .143$ ) and middle class ( $b = .06$ ,  $SE = .20$ ,  $t = 0.312$ , 95% CI =  $[-0.33, 0.45]$ ,  $p = .758$ ).

**Higher status lower class.** Participants in postcommunist societies perceived the lower class as having higher social status ( $b = .33$ ,  $SE = .12$ ,  $t = 2.669$ , 95% CI =  $[0.09, 0.57]$ ,  $p = .010$ ). No status differences were found for the working ( $b = .37$ ,  $SE = .20$ ,  $t = 1.881$ , 95% CI =  $[-0.02, 0.76]$ ,  $p = .068$ ), upper ( $b = .02$ ,  $SE = .16$ ,  $t = 0.12$ , 95% CI =  $[-0.30, 0.34]$ ,



**Figure 2.** Social classes' warmth and competence in postcommunist versus capitalist countries (Study 2).

Note. In four bar plots, we show perceived warmth and competence differences of upper-middle-class, working-class, and lower-class groups, in postcommunist and capitalist societies. X-axis represents dimensions (i.e., competence and warmth), y-axis represents ratings.

Statistical test results are shown as \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

$p = .905$ ), and middle class ( $b = .01$ ,  $SE = .23$ ,  $t = 0.051$ ,  $95\% \text{ CI} = [-0.44, 0.46]$ ,  $p = .959$ ).

**Less competitive lower class.** Finally, participants in postcommunist countries perceived the lower class as less competitive than did participants in capitalist countries ( $b = -.33$ ,  $SE = .14$ ,  $t = -2.408$ ,  $95\% \text{ CI} = [-0.60, -0.06]$ ,  $p = .021$ ). No differences were found for upper ( $b = .07$ ,  $SE = .22$ ,  $t = 0.314$ ,  $95\% \text{ CI} = [-0.35, 0.49]$ ,  $p = .755$ ), middle ( $b = -.30$ ,  $SE = .25$ ,  $t = -1.175$ ,  $95\% \text{ CI} = [-0.79, -0.20]$ ,  $p = .251$ ), and working class ( $b = -.21$ ,  $SE = .16$ ,  $t = -1.308$ ,  $95\% \text{ CI} = [-0.52, 0.10]$ ,  $p = .201$ ).

## Discussion

Comparative analyses on social class stereotypes in postcommunist versus capitalist countries revealed several of the hypothesized societal differences. Participants living in postcommunist societies evaluated both the working class and lower class more positively, but the upper class more negatively. More specifically, they perceived the working class and lower class as warmer, and the upper class as less competent than participants living in capitalist societies.

We further tested whether the differences in stereotype contents were related to differences in perceptions of the structural antecedents. The perceptions were consistent for

lower class, with higher perceived status accompanied by higher ratings on competence, and lower competition accompanied by higher warmth. However, we found no differences between the two types of society for the upper and working class. Participants in postcommunist countries evaluated the upper class as less competent but *not* lower in social status. Similarly, they evaluated the working class as warmer but *not* less competitive. As expected, no differences emerged for the middle class.

### Study 3: Communist Legacy Moderates Status–Competence and Competition–Warmth Relations

Positive images of the working class and lower class and negative images of the upper class fit long-lasting effects of the communist regime. However, as a source for such different stereotypes, we did not find the predictable, according to the SCM, differences in perceptions of the societal antecedents for the working class and upper class; that is, the working class was not evaluated as less competitive nor the upper class as having lower status. Therefore, we proceeded to test whether participants draw inferences from structural antecedents to stereotype contents differently in the two types of society. If there exist such structural differences, we should observe the stereotype–societal antecedent moderations across all social groups, not limited to social classes.

#### Method

**Participants.** We use the same datasets as in the previous section, only now including all social groups. The unit of analysis was social group. We coded missing data (status and competition were not measured) to be dropped in regression analysis in Germany, Mexico, Portugal (one group, i.e., Aunts), and Ukraine (one group, i.e., Elderly). The final sample includes 1,162 groups nested in 48 samples from 45 countries.

**Measures.** As previously, we dummy coded society type (postcommunist and capitalist). We examined group's perceived warmth, competence, social status, and competitiveness.

**Analysis strategy.** To examine whether society type moderated the relationship between social status and competence, we conducted multilevel regression with competence as the dependent variable. We added society type (categorical), social status (centered), and their interaction as predictor variables, allowing the intercept and the slope for status to vary between countries. We tested moderation by society type in the competition–warmth relationship likewise. In both models, we controlled for unemployment rates, level of inequality (Gini index), gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (all retrieved from Global Database World Bank;

statistics specific to each SCM data collection year), and mean respondent age.

**Power considerations.** The sample size of  $n = 48$  on the second level of analysis and an average of 25 groups per country are sufficient for testing cross-level interaction effects in multilevel models (Kreft, 1996, cited in Hox, 2010).

#### Results

**Qualified status–competence relations.** Consistent with SCM predictions, social status predicted competence ( $b = .735$ , 95% CI = [0.70, 0.78],  $p < .001$ ). We found a significant interaction of status and society type ( $b = -.218$ ,  $SE = .05$ ,  $t = -4.382$ , 95% CI = [−0.31, −0.12],  $p < .001$ ) on competence ratings after controlling for the relevant confounds. Each unit increase in group's perceived social status related to 0.74 increase in that group's perceived competence in capitalist countries, versus 0.52 increase in postcommunist countries (Figure 3a).


**Qualified competition–warmth relations.** Consistent with SCM predictions, perceived competition predicted warmth ( $b = -.342$ , 95% CI = [−0.48, −0.20],  $p < .001$ ). We found a significant interaction of competition and society type ( $b = -.551$ ,  $SE = .17$ ,  $t = -3.183$ , 95% CI = [−0.89, −0.22],  $p = .003$ ) on warmth ratings after controlling for the relevant confounds. Each unit increase in group's perceived competition predicted 0.34 decrease in that group's perceived warmth in capitalist countries, versus 0.89 decrease in postcommunist countries (Figure 3b).

#### Discussion

We found that society type moderates the relations between societal antecedents and group stereotypes. Participants in postcommunist societies made weaker positive inferences from social groups' status to competence, but they made stronger negative inferences from groups' perceived competition to warmth, compared with participants in capitalist societies. Such effects were observed after controlling for potential economic (inequality, GDP, unemployment) or generational (age) confounds. Thus, postcommunist samples believed less that high-status groups are necessarily competent and believed more that competitive groups are not warm.

### Study 4: Exploring Potential Societal Dynamics—Disbelief in Meritocracy and Penalty for Initiative

So far, we have treated communist legacy in a generalized way, simply contrasting postcommunist countries with societies with no communist past. To support our assumption and the empirical evidence obtained so far, we further explored



**Figure 3.** Moderation of status–competence and competition–warmth relations by society type (Study 3): (a) Status–competence relationship by society type and (b) competition–warmth relationship by society type.

Note. Ordinary least square regression lines of structural antecedents (x-axis: status and competition) and stereotype contents (y-axis: perceived competence and warmth) fitted on capitalist versus postcommunist societies, with 95% confidence interval annotated.

potential mechanisms that might link the communist ideological legacy to the observed differences in stereotype content and social antecedent relations. We tested two ideological corollaries: meritocratic beliefs and embeddedness values.

First, communist societies aimed for strict egalitarianism rather than meritocracy. Meritocratic beliefs are still not as popular in postcommunist countries as they are in capitalist countries (Kunovich & Slomczynski, 2007; Mason, 1995). This could explain the weaker status–competence link found in previous analysis. Second, communism demands putting the interests of the group above the individual self-interest. Comparative studies indicate that people in these countries value order, obedience, and conformity (embeddedness) over independence, initiative, and freedom (autonomy) more than people in countries with established democracies (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997; van den Broek & de Moor, 1994). This could explain the stronger negative link between competition and warmth. Therefore, in the next section, we explored whether meritocratic beliefs and embeddedness values moderate the status–competence and competition–warmth relations across countries.<sup>5</sup>

## Method


**Participants.** Samples were the same as previously. In addition, we integrated archival data from the WVS, Wave 6.

Twenty-seven countries in our dataset were in WVS, which gave us 630 social groups in total.

## Measures

**Meritocratic beliefs.** One item from the WVS measured meritocratic beliefs. On a 10-point scale, participants were asked to indicate whether they think 1 = *In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life*, to 10 = *Hard work doesn't generally bring success—it's more a matter of luck and connections*. We reverse-coded the scores, such that higher scores indicate higher belief in meritocracy.

**Embeddedness versus autonomy.** We calculated the index based on Schwartz Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ) from the WVS. We first calculated the scores for each cultural value and then subtracted the autonomy score from the embeddedness score to reflect the relative importance of embeddedness over autonomy in a society. Three items measured each value (Schwartz, 2006). An example of autonomy item is “It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be creative; to do things one’s own way.” Cronbach’s alpha for this scale across all samples was .54. An example of embeddedness item is “It is important to this person to always behave properly; to avoid doing anything people would say is wrong.” Cronbach’s alpha for this scale across all samples was .63.



**Figure 4.** Moderation of status–competence and competition–warmth by societal-level meritocratic beliefs and embeddedness values (Study 4): (a) Status–competence relationship by country-level meritocracy and (b) competition–warmth relationship by country-level embeddedness.

Note. Ordinary least square regression lines of structural antecedents (x-axis: status and competition) and stereotype contents (y-axis: perceived competence and warmth) fitted on meritocratic beliefs (left) and embeddedness (right). Mean and 1 standard deviation annotated.

**Analysis strategy.** To examine whether the relationships between status and competence were further moderated by meritocratic beliefs, we conducted multilevel regressions with competence as the dependent variable, social status (centered), meritocratic beliefs (centered), and their interaction as predictor variables, allowing for by-country variations in intercept and slope. We examined how embeddedness values moderate the relations between competition and warmth likewise. As in previous analysis, we controlled for unemployment rates, level of inequality, GDP per capita, and mean respondent age in both models.

**Power considerations.** The sample size of  $N = 27$  on the second level of analysis and an average of 23 groups per country approach recommended sample sizes for testing cross-level interaction effects in multilevel models (Hox, 2010).

## Results

In line with previous studies, postcommunist countries had significantly higher embeddedness scores ( $M = 1.16$ ,  $SD = 0.39$ ) than capitalist countries ( $M = 0.58$ ,  $SD = 0.36$ ;  $t = -3.70$ ,  $df = 11.8$ ,  $p = .003$ ,  $d = 1.54$ ), and lower meritocracy scores ( $M = 5.63$ ,  $SD = 0.63$ ) than capitalist countries ( $M = 5.99$ ,  $SD = 0.55$ ), although not statistically significant ( $t = 1.44$ ,  $df = 11.8$ ,  $p = .176$ ,  $d = 0.61$ ).

**Meritocratic beliefs moderate the status–competence relationship.** We found a significant interaction between meritocratic beliefs and status ( $b = .14$ ,  $SE = .06$ ,  $t = 2.31$ , 95% CI =  $[0.03, 0.25]$ ,  $p = .019$ ) in predicting competence. The higher

the country-level meritocratic beliefs, the stronger the link between status and competence (Figure 4a).

**Embeddedness values moderate the competition–warmth relationship.** We observed a significant interaction of perceived competition and embeddedness values ( $b = -.49$ ,  $SE = .18$ ,  $t = -2.78$ , 95% CI =  $[-0.84, -0.15]$ ,  $p = .011$ ). The higher the country-level preference for embeddedness over autonomy, the stronger the negative link between competition and warmth (Figure 4b).

## Discussion

We explored correlates of communist versus capitalist ideological divide that could potentially explain the qualified relations between status–competence and competition–warmth in postcommunist and capitalist societies. Disbelief in meritocracy on the societal level weakens positive inferences about competence that people draw from groups' status. The more people believe success is a matter of luck and connections, the less they relate competence to status. In addition, the societal-level preference for embeddedness over autonomy strengthens negative inferences about groups' warmth that people draw from groups' competitiveness. The more people believe one should conform to group norms, the more competition is penalized.

## General Discussion

Differences in ideological legacies of communist and capitalist countries provide a natural experiment for examining

how people's stereotypes about the same groups differ under distinct social contexts. This study contributes to the stereotype literature by (a) introducing new samples from under-represented regions of the world, (b) demonstrating how social class stereotypes differ in contexts with different ideological legacies, and (c) suggesting mechanisms that link these ideological legacies to how people draw inferences from groups' perceived status and competition.

The fact that the working class was glorified under communism (Bonnell, 1998; Fitzpatrick, 1993), but not so much under capitalism (Volpato et al., 2017), was reflected in its stereotype. Compared with participants in capitalist countries, participants in postcommunist countries mentioned working-class groups more frequently and evaluated them more positively. Stereotypes about other social classes also differ. The working class and the lower class were perceived as warmer, whereas the upper class was perceived as less competent. We found no differences in the stereotype of the middle class. These findings echo the communist legacy, which portrays positive images of the working class and its extensions (lower class; Gorshkov & Tikhonova, 2003; Ryvkina, 2001; Stenning, 2005), but negative images of the upper class. As a newly emerging group, stereotypes of the middle class seem to be unaffected by the communist past of the countries considered.

The differences in social class stereotypes were not accompanied by respective differences in perceived structural antecedents; we found no corresponding differences in perceived competition of the working class and status of the upper class. These differences likely emerge from differential strength of relations between structural antecedents and stereotypes. Specifically, although group status predicted its competence in postcommunist countries, this relation was weaker than in capitalist countries. Disbelief in meritocracy, which sets postcommunist countries apart from the others, weakened the perceived relation between competence and status. Similarly, perceived group competition was negatively related to its warmth, but this relation was much stronger than in capitalist countries. Preference for embeddedness over autonomy values, which is stronger in postcommunist countries, strengthened the competition–warmth link. Competitiveness is penalized more in societies that value obedience and conformity above individual freedom and initiative.

### *Limitations and Future Directions*

To be sure, this report has some limitations. The findings reported are correlational, which constrains our making causal interpretations. Future research should experimentally manipulate key elements that differentiate these social contexts. For instance, future studies can manipulate people's beliefs in meritocracy and embeddedness to see whether it causes the moderation effects as shown here. Note that our

current postcommunist versus capitalist comparisons situate the contextual effects with over 100 years of histories, including a second dramatic shift from communism to market economy experienced by postcommunist countries. To be certain that the communist legacy is the cause of the differences we find, longitudinal experimental manipulation is preferred but probably unrealistic.

The data from postcommunist countries were collected between 2014 and 2018, whereas from capitalist countries between 2005 and 2014. One potential alternative explanation for our findings is that social class stereotypes have simply changed over time across the globe, with working- and lower-class stereotypes becoming more positive and upper-class stereotypes becoming more negative. Given considerable variation in data collection time that our samples provide, we were able to test this alternative hypothesis. The correlations between the year of data collection and perceived competence, warmth, status, and competition provide no support for this alternative hypothesis (see Supplementary Information for details). There is either no change over time, whereas differences between the two types of societies are significant, or the direction of changes over time is opposite to the direction of differences between societies.

Country-level comparisons provide meaningful big pictures of societal effects, but they also have certain constraints. Sample size is one of them. We have a sizable SCM dataset consisting of 50 samples from 47 nations with thousands of participant responses. However, when combining with other sources (e.g., WVS), the testable sample shrinks. Moreover, country-level comparisons that use typologies (postcommunist vs. capitalist countries, in our case) run into the hazard of overgeneralizing and simplifying the world's heterogeneity. There are more than 40 countries with a communist past in the world. Our sample is limited to nine postcommunist countries, representing Europe and Asia. There are large variations across countries in how communism was implemented, how long it lasted, and what path countries took after the “era” of communism ended (Møller & Skaaning, 2009; Tucker, 1967). Because comparative research on postcommunist countries outside the European region is extremely scarce, it is difficult to evaluate whether findings of this study can be generalized to, for example, postcommunist countries in Africa or the Americas. Presumably, the effects reported here would be stronger in countries where the communist regime lasted longer and those that were geographically and politically closer to the USSR. Future research should collaborate across countries and institutions to provide more comprehensive and representative data of the world population.

Finally, to return to our title theme, stereotypes are partly accidents of history: who happens to reside where and under what circumstances. Official ideology is one circumstance that shapes the content of and rationale for stereotypes.

Figure 1 displays eight social network visualizations, one for each country: Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Each plot shows social groups as nodes (circles) and their relationships as edges. The axes represent Competence (X-axis) and Wealth (Y-axis). The groups are labeled with their respective social categories, such as Children, Elderly, Women, Youth, Educated, Unemployed, Poor, Rich, and various ethnic and religious groups. The visualizations illustrate the structure of social networks and the distribution of social groups across the Competence and Wealth dimensions for each country.

## Authors' Note

The first two authors contributed equally to this article. After the first four authors, the remaining authors are listed alphabetically.



## Declaration of Conflicting Interests

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## Supplemental Material

Supplemental material is available online with this article.

## Notes

1. All sensitivity analyses are conducted in GPower 3.1.9.2. We used paired sample *t* test with  $\alpha = .05$  and  $\beta = .95$  for sensitivity calculations for the analysis within postcommunist samples, and independent samples *t* test with the same  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  for the postcommunist versus capitalist country comparison in the next section.
2. Although the number of groups on the second level of analysis is small ( $N = 7$ ), multilevel approach is still preferable because (a) ignoring clustered nature of the data can lead to biased estimates and (b) the effects of interest in this analysis are fixed regression coefficients, which are essentially unaffected by Level 2 sample size (Maas & Hox, 2005).
3. Kosovo (as part of the former Yugoslavia) was under a communist regime for a shorter period of time compared with the other countries considered in the current research. In fact, Yugoslavia embraced the communist ideology only after World War II, in 1945, and tried to stay as independent from the USSR as possible.
4. A potential alternative explanation for this finding could be that the upper class in postcommunist countries is more corrupt; hence, the differences in perceived competence can be explained by perceived corruption rather than communist legacy. We tested this alternative explanation by controlling for the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). CPI did not have an effect on stereotypes of the upper class ( $b = .0005$ ,  $SE = .002$ ,  $t = 0.187$ ,  $p = .853$ ), whereas the effect of society type remained significant ( $b = -.325$ ,  $SE = .14$ ,  $t = -2.28$ ,  $p = .028$ ).
5. This analysis is exploratory. In addition to meritocratic beliefs and embeddedness values, we explored other ideology-related variables: corruption perception (Transparency International) as a moderator of status–competence relationship, and positive

belief in competition (WVS, Wave 6), institutional collectivism (GLOBE), ingroup collectivism (GLOBE), and Hofstede individualism–collectivism as moderators of competition–warmth relationship (see details in the online supplement).

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